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CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ:
LEGAL ISSUES, ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
ALICIA M. LENDON

INTRODUCTION
One of the most universal and fundamental aspects of college life for students is
the ability to join and participate in a variety of student organizations. Most schools
provide specific guidelines for potential groups to follow in order to gain formal
recognition from the school. Because these organizations are de facto extensions of, and
representative of, the school with which they are affiliated, schools have an interest in the
nature and composition of the organizations.
In recent years, government recognition and protection of gays and lesbians has
grown through a variety of channels. While the United States Supreme Court’s 2003
decision in Lawrence v. Texas1 is widely considered the most progressive step in the gay
rights’ movement, it was the 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans2 that initially cleared the
way for widespread inclusion of “sexual orientation” as a protected classification in
nondiscrimination policies. However, because of the sensitivity of the issue of
homosexuality in many religions, new issues have arisen at the cross-section of First
Amendment religious protections and nondiscrimination laws. “Several major religions
in America teach that homosexuality is wrong by divine mandate and conclude that they
1

539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) and struck down Texas’s (and similar laws in other states) antisodomy law as an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
substantive due process.
2
517 U.S. 620 (1996). The state of Colorado placed Amendment 2 on its ballot, which would
have prevented any state or local agency from including sexual orientation in its
nondiscrimination policies, or taking any actions recognizing homosexual persons as a protected
class. The Supreme Court struck down the amendment as an unconstitutional violation of equal
protection using only a rational basis standard.

cannot support social and legal trends favorable to homosexuals without ignoring the
commands of the God they worship.”3 With a growing number of state and local
governments banning discrimination based on sexual orientation, a conflict arises. In
particular, the United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez4 to resolve some of the lingering issues surrounding the conflict
between religion and sexual orientation.
This case touches on a variety of legal principles that overlap and intertwine
with each other. Among them are First Amendment freedoms of speech and expressive
association, the various “forums” that a government creates for the expression of speech,
viewpoint-discrimination versus viewpoint-neutrality, and whether the government must
subsidize constitutionally protected freedoms. This paper will explain these legal
principles and provide each side’s legal arguments. Additionally, it will attempt to
distinguish this particular situation from previous Supreme Court jurisprudence, and
determine how the Court is likely to decide.
In Part I of this paper, it provides a historical background of the policies and
events that this case evolved from. In Subsection A, it explains the process a group of
students must go through to become a Registered Student Organization at the University
of California-Hastings College of Law, and provides the text of the policies that must be
adopted. In Subsection B, it describes the initial recognition and subsequent changes in
the Hastings chapter of the Christian Legal Society that spurred this litigation, and in
Subsection C it details the procedural history of the case.
3

J. Brady Brammer, Religious Groups and the Gay Rights Movement: Recognizing Common
Ground, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2006).
4
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, No. 08-1371
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2009).
1

Part II of the paper presents the different legal issues that this case entails,
beginning with the Christian Legal Society’s positions in Part A. Part B lays out the
positions of Respondents University of California-Hastings and Hastings Outlaw. Then,
Part III, Subsection A sorts through both arguments and uses Supreme Court precedent to
predict the outcome of the case. In Subsection B, the paper addresses some tangential
areas of law this decision will likely affect, and concludes.

I.
A.

BACKGROUND

University of California-Hastings College of Law’s Registered Student
Organizations
As do most law schools and universities, The University of California-Hastings

College of Law (“Hastings”), has a procedure for allowing students to form extracurricular organizations.5 Purpose, size and interests of these groups vary greatly, but
schools encourage students to participate to enhance their academic endeavors through
additional social and educational opportunities.6 Hastings provides certain benefits to
officially recognized student organizations.7 Such benefits include the ability to apply for
funding from the school, use of school space for meetings and events, access to schoolwide communication such as email listservs and bulletin boards, and recognition in

Brief of Hastings College of the Law Respondents at 3, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, No.
08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19, 2010). [hereinafter Hastings].
6
Brief on the Merits for Respondent-Intervenor Hastings Outlaw at 2, Christian Legal Soc’y v.
Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19, 2010). [hereinafter Outlaws].
7
Hastings, supra note 5, at 3.
5

2

school publications.8 However, limited access to some of these benefits is available to
non-registered organizations as well.9
At Hastings, a registered student organization (RSO) must meet several basic
requirements for its application to be approved: (1) it cannot be a commercial
organization, (2) its membership must be limited to Hastings students, and (3) it must
“agree to abide by [Hastings’] policies and regulations, including its longstanding
nondiscrimination policy.”10 The policy, which has been in place since 1990, states,
The College is committed to a policy against legally
impermissible, arbitrary or unreasonable discriminatory
practices. All groups, including administration, faculty, student
governments, College-owned student residence facilities and
programs sponsored by the College, are governed by this policy
of nondiscrimination.
The College’s
policy on
nondiscrimination is to comply fully with applicable law.
The University of California, Hastings College of the Law shall
not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual
orientation. This nondiscrimination policy covers admission,
access and treatment in Hastings-sponsored programs and
activities.11
Hastings requires its nondiscrimination policy be included in each group’s bylaws or
constitution, and actually goes above and beyond the stated policy by requiring that RSOs
explicitly state all students must be welcomed as members of each RSO.12 Specifically,
the school “requires that [RSOs] allow any student to participate, become a member, or

Brief for Petitioner at 4, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19,
2010). [hereinafter Christian Legal Society].
9
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 4.
10
Hastings, supra note 5, at 4.
11
Id. The policy is also written in Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 9.
12
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 6.
8
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seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of their status and beliefs.”13
Some, limited circumstances allow for membership limitations, but only if the
requirements are completely neutral, and the initial opportunity is available to all
students.14 Such acceptable circumstances include attendance requirements or baseline
academic criteria.15
At the time this lawsuit was filed, Hastings had approximately 60 RSOs.16 The
types of groups granted RSO status varied widely, including political groups, academic
groups, social groups, athletic groups and professional groups.17 Additionally, there were
three religious groups at the time that the Christian Legal Society filed its petition to
become an RSO, the Muslim Law Students, the Jewish Law Students, and Hastings
Koinonia.18 Each of the described groups had open membership policies and included
Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy in its bylaws.19
Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy is standard, and similar policies are in place at
law schools throughout the United States. The Association of American Law Schools
(“AALS”), which is comprised of 171 schools,20 encourages member schools to “provide
equality of opportunity in legal education for all,” and Bylaw §6-3(a) of AALS contains
the group’s sexual orientation-inclusive nondiscrimination policy.21 Each member school
13

Hastings, supra note 5, at 5.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. This is also mentioned in Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 3.
17
Hastings, supra note 5, at 5. See also Outlaws, supra note 6, at 3, and Christian Legal Society,
supra note 8, at 3.
18
Hastings, supra note 5, at 5.
19
Id.
20
Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Law Schools in Support of Respondents at 1,
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19, 2010). [hereinafter AALS].
21
Id. at 2. The policy does include an exception for religiously affiliated schools; however,
because Hastings is a public, secular institution, it is not relevant to the discussion at hand.
4
14

is free to make its own determination in how to apply this standard to its student
organizations.22

Similarly, the American Bar Association (“ABA”), a legal professional

organization of over 400,000, encourages its group members to prohibit discrimination
on a variety of grounds.23 Its bylaws read, “[t]he Division shall not discriminate on the
basis of ancestry, color, or race; cultural or ethnic background; economic disadvantage;
ideological, philosophical or political belief or affiliation; marital or parental status;
national or regional origin; physical disability; religion, or religious or denominational
affiliation; sex; sexual orientation; or age.”24 Further, the ABA encourages its members
to prohibit use of facilities or gatherings to organizations that discriminate on any of these
bases.25
At the time this lawsuit was filed, Christian Legal Society was the only group at
Hastings whose petition to become an RSO had been denied.26 However, the Christian
Legal Society was also the only group to ever seek to exclude Hastings’
nondiscrimination policy from its bylaws and to preclude certain persons from obtaining
full membership status on the basis of identity or beliefs.27

22

AALS, supra note 20, at 2.
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Respondents at 2, Christian
Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19, 2010). [hereinafter ABA].
24
Id.
25
Id. at 3.
26
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 4.
27
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 7.
23
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B.

History of the Christian Legal Society at Hastings

The Christian Legal Society is a national organization, founded in 1961, that
allows a variety of persons in the legal profession to engage in fellowship and gain
“moral and spiritual guidance.”28 The Christian Legal Society has chapters at law
schools throughout the country.29 From the Fall 1994 semester until the Spring 2002
semester, there was an RSO called the Hastings Christian Legal Society; however, it was
not affiliated with the national organization,30 and it abided by all Hastings’ rules and
regulations.31 In 2002, the group changed its name to Hastings Christian Fellowship.32 At
that time it had a policy that explicitly stated that “all students” were welcome as leaders
and voting members.33 In fact, during the 2003-2004 school year, an openly gay female
student was a voting member of the Hastings Christian Fellowship.34
At the beginning of the 2004-2005 academic year, Hastings Christian Fellowship
again became the Christian Legal Society, and sought to become an affiliated chapter of
the national Christian Legal Society.35 In order to be recognized by the national chapter,
the organization was required to adopt the national organization’s policies and bylaws.36
One particular policy that the national Christian Legal Society requires is that all students
sign a “Statement of Faith” to be a fully recognized member.37 Any student that does not
sign, or abide by, the Christian Legal Society’s Statement of Faith would not be allowed
28

Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
30
Id. at 7.
31
Hastings, supra note 5, at 5-6.
32
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 8.
33
Hastings, supra note 5, at 6.
34
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 8.
35
Id. See also Hastings, supra note 6 at 6.
36
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 8. See also Outlaws, supra note 6, at 9.
37
Hastings, supra note 5, at 6. See also Outlaws, supra note 6, at 9.
29
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to vote for, or become, leaders within the organization.38 The relevant portion of the
Statement of Faith, in conflict with Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy, says that,
[i]n view of the clear dictates of Scripture, unrepentant
participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is
inconsistent with an affirmation of the Statement of Faith, and
consequently may be regarded by CLS as disqualifying such an
individual from CLS membership.39
After being notified by Hastings Director of Student Services of the school’s
requirements to become an RSO,40 the Christian Legal Society filed an application for
recognition.41 The constitution the Christian Legal Society submitted did not include
religion or sexual orientation in its nondiscrimination policy, and the school notified the
group that it was not in compliance with Hastings’ requirements to become an RSO.42
The group refused to make the requested changes to its constitution, and asked the school
for an exemption from the policy through a letter written by the national Christian Legal
Society organization.43 The Christian Legal Society was then formally denied its
application to become an RSO, but was notified by the school that it would still be
allowed to use Hastings facilities for its meetings, and could advertise its events on
classroom chalkboards and general bulletin boards.44 The Christian Legal Society did not
request to use Hastings facilities during the 2004-2005 year.45 Subsequent to the

38

Outlaws, supra note 6, at 9.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S.
argued Apr. 19, 2010). [hereinafter Petition for Writ].
40
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 8.
41
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 9.
42
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 11. See also Outlaws, supra note 6, at 10. and
Hastings, supra note 5, at 6.
43
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 10. See also Christian Legal Society, supra note 8 at 11.
44
Outlaws, supra note 6 at 11-12.
45
Id. at 11.
39

7

decision, Hastings revoked a $250 grant of travel funds it had previously approved for the
group.46
C.

The Case’s Procedural History

The Christian Legal Society filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California shortly after it was formally denied its RSO
petition.47 The Christian Legal Society’s complaint alleged that its First Amendment
rights to free association, free speech, free exercise of religion, and its right to equal
protection had been violated.48 After an amended complaint was filed, another RSO—
Hastings Outlaw—successfully petitioned the court to become an IntervenorRespondent.49 Outlaw’s mission in intervening is to “protect the interests of its members
and of other gay, lesbian and bisexual students who wish to attend law school in an
environment free from discrimination and who wish to have an equal opportunity to
become members of any registered student organization without regard to sexual
orientation.”50
Both sides filed motions for summary judgment, and the District Court ruled in
favor of the Respondents, finding that the Christian Legal Society’s First Amendment
rights were not violated.51 The District Court found that Hastings’ nondiscrimination
policy did not violate the Christian Legal Society’s right to free speech because it

46

Hastings, supra note 5, at 6.
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 12. See also Hastings, supra note 5, at 13.
48
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 12. See also Hastings, supra note 5, at 13.
49
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 15.
50
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 12-13.
51
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 15. See also Hastings, supra note 5, at 14 and
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 13.
47

8

regulated conduct, not speech.52 Additionally, the Court determined that, even if the
policy directly prohibited particular speech, Hastings had created a “limited public
forum,” and because the policy is both reasonable and viewpoint neutral, it does not
infringe on the Christian Legal Society’s rights.53
On its claim of infringement on its right to free association, the District Court
determined that official recognition by Hastings was not required for the group to
function and associate fully, as evidenced by its existence during the 2004-2005 school
year.54 The group’s right to exclude any persons from its group had not been infringed
upon. Rather, Hastings has simply created a set of requirements to gain school funds.55
The Christian Legal Society claimed that the group was denied RSO status specifically
because of its religious beliefs; however, the District Court found that evidence supported
the exact opposite conclusion.56 Previously, for ten years, the school had recognized this
exact group; the school did not refuse recognition until failed to adopt Hastings’
nondiscrimination policy.57
The Christian Legal Society appealed the District Court’s decision to the Ninth
Circuit, where the court affirmed the decision in a two-sentence, unpublished opinion.58
Citing a recent Ninth Circuit decision,59 the Court held that the conditions for recognition
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347, at 17.
Id. at 34-45.
54
Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27341 at 51.
55
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 14.
56
Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27341 at 42.
57
Id. at 43.
58
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (9th Cir. 2009).
59
Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008). In this case, a group of Christian
students wished to form a chartered club at Kentridge High School called “Truth.” Truth filed
several charters with the Associated Student Body (“ASB”) for approval; they were all either
denied or not acted upon. When the third and final charter was denied, the ASB gave four
reasons for denying the charter: 1) the name “Truth” indicated that the ASB believed that group’s
9
52
53

were both viewpoint neutral and reasonable, and did not violate the Christian Legal
Society’s First Amendment rights.60 Subsequently, the Christian Legal Society petitioned
the Supreme Court of the United States, and the writ of certiorari was granted.61

II.
A.

THE LEGAL ISSUES AND POSITIONS FACING THE COURT
Christian Legal Society’s Arguments before the Supreme Court

In The Christian Legal Society’s Petition to the Supreme Court for Writ of
Certiorari,62 they relied heavily on the notion that the Ninth Circuit’s decision63 created a
circuit split.64 The Christian Legal Society contends that in Christian Legal Society v.
Walker,65 the Seventh Circuit came to a “diametrically opposite result” from the decision

religion was the only accurate one, 2) the group could not require students to sign a Statement of
Faith prior to gaining voting privileges within the group, 3) the group’s divided membership
classifications did not comply with school policy, and 4) the ASB feared that approving a
religious club in school would violate the “separation of church and state.” After it was denied,
the group filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the Western District of Washington. Though the
court did not come to a decision on several of Truth’s claims, the court held that Truth’s First
Amendment rights were not violated by the school’s actions. The school’s enforcement of its
nondiscrimination policy, by not allowing the group to discriminate based on religion in shaping
its membership, was constitutionally permissible.
60
Hastings, supra note 5, at 15.
61
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8 at 17.
62
Petition for Writ, supra note 39.
63
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. 645.
64
Petition for Writ, supra note 39, at 18.
65
453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006). Southern Illinois University School of Law revoked official
student organization status from the Christian Legal Society after determining that it was not in
compliance with the school’s nondiscrimination policy. Specifically, the group required students
to agree to abide by a statement of faith to become voting members or leaders within the group.
Included in the statement of faith is a disavowment of certain sexual practices, which ultimately
excluded homosexual students from obtaining full membership status in the group. The Christian
Legal Society filed suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, and the District
Court denied the group’s request for a preliminary injunction, requiring the school to grant them
recognition. The Seventh Circuit, however, overturned the District Court and found for the
Christian Legal Society, holding that enforcement of the school’s nondiscrimination policy was a
violation of the Christian Legal Society’s First Amendment rights.
10

reached in the lower court of this case.66 It is the Christian Legal Society’s contention
that “Walker is on all fours with this case,” and thus, the Ninth Circuit erred in finding for
Hastings.67
Additionally, much of The Christian Legal Society’s arguments are based upon
three cases from the Supreme Court, Healy v. James,68 Rosenberger v. Rector of the
University of Virginia,69 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.70 The Christian Legal
Society contends that its RSO denial severely burdens its ability to freely express its
religious beliefs, and violates its First Amendment right of freedom of association and
speech.71 Largely dependent on the belief that Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy is

66

Petition for Writ, supra note 39, at 18.
Id. at 19-20.
68
408 U.S. 169 (1972). Students sought to form a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society
(“SDS”) at Central Connecticut State College, and were denied official recognition. Recognition
would allow the group access to school facilities and advertisement methods. The school stated
that they group had not been able to provide enough evidence they were independent of the
national SDS group, which often engaged in disruptive and violent behavior. After the District
Court held that the denial did not violate the students’ freedom of association rights, the Court of
Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that the petitioners had a
valid First Amendment right to freely associate, and that the burden for restricting this right was
on the school to prove its justification was compelling and necessary.
69
515 U.S. 819 (1995). Rosenberger, a student, requested funds from the University of Virginia
for printing costs of a Christian-focused newspaper. After the school denied the requests and the
District Court and Court of Appeals affirmed the school’s decision, the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court held that because the University funded other newspapers, including some with
religious content, that this denial constituted viewpoint discrimination, and violated
Rosenberger’s First Amendment right to free speech. The school was free to deny publication
funding based on content, but not based on viewpoint.
70
530 U.S. 640 (2000). After the Boy Scouts of America revoked a scoutmaster’s (Dale’s)
membership because of his homosexuality, Dale filed suit, and the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that New Jersey public accommodation law required the Boy Scouts to include homosexuals
in its group. The New Jersey courts held that Dale’s inclusion did not violate the Scouts’ First
Amendment right to freedom of association because it did not affect the group’s purpose, and it
did not require the group endorse any particular message. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed, and held for the Boy Scouts, stating that the group had a legitimate reason to
support a specific moral code that did not include homosexual activity, and to force the group to
accept open homosexuals as troop leaders sent a message contrary to the one it wished to proffer.
This violated the group’s right to freedom of association.
71
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 2.
11
67

viewpoint discriminatory, the Christian Legal Society contends that Hastings does not
further a compelling government interest, and that it unconstitutional.72 Additionally, the
Christian Legal Society asserts that Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy is counterintuitive
to the school’s overarching goals, and especially burdensome on small or religiously
affiliated student organizations.73
The Christian Legal Society disputes the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that Hastings’
policy affects only conduct, rather than speech, and that the policy indeed violates the
group’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech.74 In order to deny a group access
to a speech forum, it contends, the school bears the burden75 and must prove that the
denial is narrowly applied and serves a “compelling state interest.”76 While it would,
indeed, be in the school’s interest to not violate the First Amendment principles
prohibiting the government from establishing a religion, Hastings need not worry about
this, as it explicitly requires RSOs to acknowledge that they are independent of the
college and are not sponsored by Hastings.77 Additionally, Christian Legal Society
proffers that the school’s own policy states that it should “ensure an ongoing opportunity
for the expression of a variety of viewpoints… in accordance with the highest standards

72

Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 53.
74
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 35.
75
Id. at 21.
76
Id., quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981). The University of Missouri
revoked the right of a Christian group—Cornerstone—to use school rooms for worship and other
meetings, on the grounds that it violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The
Supreme Court held that the University had created a “limited public forum,” and thus, could not
infringe on the group’s right to freedom of speech and association. In this case, those rights
outweighed the establishment clause. The Court held that in a limited public forum, a school may
not discriminate based on protected classifications of persons and identities, and that only
content-based discrimination, rather than viewpoint discrimination, was permissible.
77
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 23.
12
73

of… freedom of expression.”78 By requiring the Christian Legal Society to accept
members that did not comport with its religious convictions, its right to freedom of
expression, speech, and association was being violated.79
While the District Court found that the Christian Legal Society’s continued
existence served as evidence that its rights to freedom of association had not been
violated,80 the Christian Legal Society argues that these restrictions are indeed
burdensome on the group’s First Amendment rights.81 As the Supreme Court noted in
Healy, official recognition is “vital” to a student group’s ability to function properly,82
and the group’s ability to access traditional forms of student communication is a
substantial need to be an effective group.83 Further, a group’s ability to find alternate
meeting locations and engage in its expressive conduct elsewhere does not alleviate
Hastings’ violations of the First Amendment.84 According to the Christian Legal Society,
because Hastings’ policy is viewpoint discriminatory and burdensome on Christian Legal
Society, the school must prove that its limitations are reasonable and are the “least
restrictive means” of proving its purpose.85 It is the Christian Legal Society’s position
that Hastings does not have a compelling interest in enforcing its nondiscrimination

78

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 27-29.
80
Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347, at 58-59.
81
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 23.
82
Id. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972).
83
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 24.
84
Id. See also Healy, 408 U.S. at 182-183; Widmar, 464 U.S. at 288; and Board of Education
v.Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990).
85
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 26.
79
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policy against the Christian Legal Society, but that even if it did, it is overly restrictive
and, therefore, unconstitutional.86
The Christian Legal Society argues that its freedom of association is infringed
upon because, if it expresses it fully, the University withholds benefits it would otherwise
be entitled to.87 Additionally, it claims that Hastings’ policy “interfere[s] with the
internal organization.”88 The Christian Legal Society states that, particularly for religious
and other small student organizations, to mandate that an RSO open its leadership
positions to any member of the student body dilutes the group’s ability to express its
message and create an environment where its own religious beliefs can be adequately
discussed and taught.89 If Christian Legal Society is forced to allow any person, without
regard to religious beliefs, become a leader in the group, it will not be able to ensure that
the message comports with the original intention of the group.90 Small groups, such as
the Christian Legal Society, are especially susceptible to a “takeover” by students who
disagree with its religious beliefs, because a smaller number of students would be
necessary to ensure that rogue students are selected to leadership positions.91
If the controlling Hastings policy is that of the written nondiscrimination policy,
then religious groups—such as the Christian Legal Society—are the only groups required
86

Id. at 21.
Id. at 26.
88
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-623 (1984). The United States Jaycees limited full
membership opportunities to men between the ages of 18 and 35. After two chapters began
admitted women in accordance with a local nondiscrimination law, the national organization
revoked their charters, and the chapters sued. The Supreme Court found that the organization
was not of the kind usually afforded First Amendment protection for freedom of association.
However, even if were, the members’ rights were not sufficiently infringed upon, and the State’s
compelling justification for enforcing its nondiscrimination laws prevailed.
89
Christian Legal Society, surpra note 8, at 27-30.
90
Id. at 30.
91
Id. at 29.
14
87

to allow persons who hold fundamentally different beliefs to partake fully in the
organization.92 The Christian Legal Society uses the Hastings Democratic Caucus as an
example of a group that can discriminate against persons that hold beliefs that contradict
the goals of the mission.93 Under the written policy, discrimination based on political
affiliation is not one of the enumerated prohibitions.94 Therefore, religious groups’
associations are required to abide by a limitation that no other type of group faces: the
insistence that it accept voting members who do not comport with the underlying
objective in creating the group.95 This is viewpoint discrimination.96
Hastings denied Christian Legal Society’s application on the basis that it
discriminated on both religion and sexual orientation.97 The Christian Legal Society
claims that the sexual orientation provision is equally discriminatory based on
viewpoint.98 The Christian Legal Society’s Statement of Faith that is in contradiction
with Hastings’ policy requires that all persons disavow any sexual activity outside of
marriage.99 Because the Christian Legal Society’s restriction is not merely based on
conduct or attraction, but rather conduct combined with a specific belief that the behavior
is morally acceptable, the Christian Legal Society alleges that the policy infringes on the

92

Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 28.
94
Hastings, supra note 5, at 4.
95
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 37.
96
Id. at 36.
97
Id. at 11.
98
Id. at 39.
99
Id. at 7.
93
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group’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression.100 No other type of group is
prohibited from ensuring its leadership comports with its beliefs and principles.101
The final primary argument for the Christian Legal Society addresses Hastings’
alternative interpretation of its RSO requirement: that organizations abide by an “allcomers” policy.102 Hastings’ written policy lists specific groups of persons that cannot be
discriminated against in the membership or leadership decisions of an RSO.103 However,
Hastings maintains that, once put into effect, the school provides that its
nondiscrimination policy is actually broader than the written enumeration of definable
characteristics. Rather, all RSOs are required to admit any student to all levels of its
membership.104 According to the Christian Legal Society, there are two policies: 1) the
official, written policy, and 2) the unofficial interpretation the school has applied.105 To
the Christian Legal Society, the broader policy is even more counterintuitive and
unconstitutional than Hastings’ written policy.106 Even if the Court finds that the policy
is viewpoint neutral, it cannot be said to be reasonable.107 Further, such a policy would
prove contrary to Hastings’ stated goals of recognizing and fostering a variety of student
groups. “Free association, including the right to exclude, better facilitates the goal of

100

Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 30.
102
Id. at 47.
103
For text of this policy, supra Part I, Subsection A, page 4.
104
Hastings, supra note 5, at 1.
105
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 47. Hastings, however, maintains that it has one
policy regarding students’ ability to fully participate in RSOs. “To be clear, Hastings has one
policy: every student group wishing to become an RSO must admit “any student … regardless of
their status or beliefs.” Hastings refers to that policy as the open-membership or all-comers
policy. That policy is how Hastings ensures compliance with the written nondiscrimination
provision in the School’s RSO program and its legal obligations under state law.” See Hastings,
supra note 5, at 20-21.
106
Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 49.
107
Id.
16
101

promoting an exchange of ideas; it protects the seedbeds where ideas emerge and mature
in the first place. There can be diversity of viewpoints in a forum if groups are not
permitted to form around viewpoints.”108 Not only would students with diametrically
opposite views have the opportunity to sabotage groups with opposing opinions, indeed,
organizations would simply merge into broad topics, and would “defeat[] the very
purpose of recognizing any group as a group in the first place.”109
The Christian Legal Society argues that denial of official recognition by Hastings
has placed a severe burden on the Christian Legal Society’s First Amendment freedoms.
By denying the Christian Legal Society generally available funds and methods of
communication, Hastings has unconstitutionally discriminated against the Christian Legal
Society because of its students’ religious and moral beliefs. The group further claims that
because the school is a public forum and it does not provide a compelling justification, it
must grant the Christian Legal Society recognition.
B.

Hastings’ and the Hastings Outlaw’s Arguments Before the Supreme Court
In response to the Christian Legal Society’s claims against Hastings, the school

and Respondent Intervenor Hastings Outlaw (“Outlaw”) maintain that Hastings’ openmembership policy for recognizing RSOs is a constitutional pre-requisite for certain
school benefits.110 Specifically, because Hastings has created a limited public forum, it
must only prove that its stipulations are viewpoint-neutral, reasonable given the purpose
of the public forum, and non-coercive.111 While the Christian Legal Society contends
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that the RSO forum is an “open speech forum,”112 the Outlaws argue that the forum is
indeed limited in its very nature.113 Because the law school is offering otherwise
inaccessible resources to persons that meet a particular set of criteria for “a particular
purpose,” they have created a constitutional limited forum.114
The Christian Legal Society offers two interpretations of the exact policy
Hastings proffers for RSO memberships: the written policy, which enumerates qualities
that may not be used as a basis for discrimination, and the “spoken” policy, which
requires an “open membership” to all students.115 Hastings argues that, regardless of the
precise interpretation of the policy, it is viewpoint-neutral.116 The school’s openmembership, or all-comers, policy is “quintessentially viewpoint-neutral” because it
applies uniformly as a prerequisite for obtaining RSO status.117 The grant of RSO status
to many religious organizations, including the Christian Legal Society prior to its
adoption of new bylaws, underscores Hastings’ neutrality in enforcing its nondiscrimination policy.118 Though the Christian Legal Society’s religious beliefs do not
comport with Hastings’ non-discrimination policy, and this led to the denial of its RSO
application, Hastings had not violated the Christian Legal Society’s First Amendment
rights. The school is not obligated to subsidize the Christian Legal Society’s
discriminatory conduct excluding gays and lesbians from leadership positions of
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discrimination if its non-discrimination policy is uniformly applied.119 However, if the
court applies the “written” non-discrimination policy, it is equally viewpoint-neutral.120
Further, Hastings and Outlaw argue that the policy is reasonable in light of the
goals and intent in creating the limited public forum.121 Hastings’ goal in fostering many
RSOs is to ensure that all students have access to a wide variety of groups that develop
educational, leadership and social skills.122 Here, the money allocated to RSOs comes
from a student activity fund that all students pay into.123 Because all Hastings students
contribute, it follows that it is a reasonable requirement that all activities the funds are
used for are open to all students.124 Further, California state law mandates that public
universities abide by a nondiscrimination policy125 that includes both religion and sexual
orientation for all activities using public funds or facilities.126 In opposition to the
Christian Legal Society’s suggestion that an open-membership policy will result in
“hostile takeovers” from persons that share views or beliefs inapposite, Outlaw points out
that the version of the Christian Legal Society that was an RSO for ten years had no such
experience with its open-membership policy; further, in the twenty-plus years Hastings
has had RSOs with open-membership requirements, nothing of this sort has taken
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place.127 Thus, Hastings’ insistence that RSOs comply with the same policy is
reasonable.
Hastings argues that once a limited forum is established, the Supreme Court of the
United States established first in Grove City College v. Bell128 that First Amendment
rights are not infringed upon through limits in a government program if the restrictions on
participation are reasonable in light of the purpose of the program, and the choice offered
is non-coercive.129 The Christian Legal Society’s choice here is almost identical: in
order to receive funds from the government, the private group must comply with the
state’s non-discrimination policies. In this case, Hastings is neither forcing the Christian
Legal Society to accept particular members nor forcing it to endorse beliefs that it would
not otherwise endorse.130 Rather, the Hastings policy makes certain benefits available to
the Christian Legal Society, if they comply with a standard, viewpoint-neutral
nondiscrimination policy; the Christian Legal Society has complete authority to choose to
forgo the modest benefits if it does not wish to comply with the conditions imposed.131
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III.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A.

Analysis and Prediction

As stated in the Petitioner’s brief to the Supreme Court, the issue at hand is,
“[w]hether the Constitution permits a public university law school to exclude a religious
student organization from a forum of speech solely because the group requires its officers
and voting members to share its core religious commitments.”132 In granting certiorari
for this case, the United Supreme Court will settle a split between the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits. While the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision for Hastings in
this case, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the Christian Legal Society chapter at the
Southern Illinois University School of Law (“SIU”) in a case almost identical to the one
at bar.133
An important distinction between this case and Christian Legal Society v. Walker
that the Christian Legal Society fails to acknowledge, however, is that SIU did not grant
the group any access to school facilities or communication.134 The Seventh Circuit
discussed, at length, the similarities between Walker and Healy v. James,135 because in
both instances, the excluded groups were effectively “frozen out… of their
universities.”136 In the case at bar, it is already established—and acknowledged by the
Christian Legal Society—that the school has continued to allow the group to meet on
campus, and has provided several channels of communication to the group. The ultimate
treatment of the groups on each campus was vastly different. Thus, the Christian Legal
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Society’s contention that these two cases are identical and that these two Circuit court
decisions are precisely in contrast with each other is not accurate.
Hastings has maintained that the group may exist, thrive, and have access to
certain University facilities and communications, regardless of who it includes or
excludes.137 This is in direct conflict with the Christian Legal Society’s reliance on the
Healy precedent, and its claim that denial of its application is “presumptively
unconstitutional.”138 As Hastings points out in its brief,
The Court’s use of the term “prior restraint” was explicitly tied to
the fact that the college in that case had not just refused to
recognize the student group at issue—it systematically sought to
prevent the group from existing on campus, even going so far as to
disband an informal meeting of the group in a “campus coffee
shop.”139
Unlike in Healy and Walker, Hastings has not attempted to forbid the Christian Legal
Society from existing and thriving on campus. Therefore, the denial of official
recognition cannot be presumptively unconstitutional or a “prior restraint” on the group’s
expression of its First Amendment rights.
The Ninth Circuit correctly applied the same legal reasoning in this case
that it did in Truth v. Kent.140 Though the school in Truth is a high school, as opposed to
a public law school like Hastings, the legal issues are still comparable. As in Truth,
Hastings requires that any group that receives RSO status welcome all students to vote
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and fully participate. Kent School District had the same requirements, which the Ninth
Circuit deemed viewpoint-neutral and reasonable.141
Returning to the various legal claims, the Court must ultimately determine the
nature of the forum Hastings has created, whether enforcement of the policy is viewpointneutral or viewpoint-discriminatory, and whether, in the light of the answers to the first
two questions, the student members of the Christian Legal Society have had their First
Amendment rights unconstitutionally infringed upon.
The Christian Legal Society contends in its introduction that Hastings has created
an “open public forum,” while simultaneously equating its current situation to the
production of newspapers in Rosenberger. Unlike Rosenberger, Hastings is not
systematically denying RSO applications for all religious groups. On the contrary, many
groups—including the previous form of the Christian Legal Society—have enjoyed the
rights and benefits of RSO status at Hastings for years. In Rosenberger, the school’s
decision was inherently viewpoint-discriminatory because the school refused to provide
the funds based solely on the fact that it was a religious newspaper, which constituted
prohibited religious activity within the school’s definition.142 On the contrary, Hastings’
denial of funds to the Christian Legal Society was based upon a policy that controls the
conduct of every RSO. Hastings is not trying to regulate the content of the message the
group, but rather its conduct in prohibiting certain students from fully participating in its
organization.
Further, simply recognizing that the Christian Legal Society has a constitutional
right to expressive association does not require that Hastings provide it funding. The
141
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United States Supreme Court upheld, in Board of Regents v. Southworth,143 that it is
constitutionally permissible for public schools to have mandatory student activity fees,
used to fund official student organizations. However, the Court was very clear that it is
only constitutional if neutrally applied.144 Under the Southworth framework, if a school
has a viewpoint-neutral policy for determining which student groups are eligible for
funding, it is constitutionally permissible to both collect the funds, and distribute them to
those groups who comport to the neutral standards the school sets forth.
Accordingly, the fact that Hastings provides funding for other, similar groups is
not determinative in whether it must provide like funding for all groups. Having a
constitutionally protected right to something does not then require that the government
subsidize, or fund, that right. Though women have a constitutionally protected right to an
abortion, public hospitals are not constitutionally required to offer the services, nor are
the government required to “fund advocacy of abortion, even if it funds advocacy of
other options for pregnant women.”145 The only exception to this rule is in cases of
traditionally public forums of speech.146 Here, it is evident that the Court will hold that
Hastings has created a limited public forum, and because its imposed requirements are
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reasonable to reach its goals for the forum, Hastings is therefore not presumptively
required to fund the expressive association.
Once the Supreme Court establishes there is a limited public forum, and the
school is using a viewpoint-neutral policy, the court must finally apply a balancing test to
ensure that the policy is both reasonable and non-coercive in its application. That is, a
group’s presumption of freedom of expressive association can be limited by a reasonable
and non-coercive government interest, especially when the speech forum has been limited
with a particular interest in mind.147 As has been established, Hastings’ interest in
recognizing various organizations is to provide auxiliary learning experiences to all of its
students, regardless of beliefs or status. The government’s interest in this matter goes
beyond Hastings’ decision; the state of California has prohibited public school funds
from being distributed to “any program or activity” that discriminates on a variety of
bases, including sexual orientation and religion.148 It is undoubtedly reasonable that the
government has an interest in ensuring public funds are not used at the expense of any
group or class of persons.
On the issue of coercion, the Christian Legal Society relies heavily on the Court’s
decision in Boy Scouts v. Dale.149 However, this case is readily distinguishable from the
one at bar. In Dale, the New Jersey courts sought to compel the Boy Scouts to include
Dale, an openly gay man, as a leader in the organization due to its public
accommodations laws.150 Contrary to the situation here, the Boy Scouts’ freedom of
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expressive association would have, indeed, been infringed upon because of the lack of
choice in the matter. Here, the Christian Legal Society’s freedom of expressive
association is not hindered in any way. If the group has a religious objection to persons
that engage in “homosexual activity,” they absolutely have the First Amendment right to
exclude such people from representing the group in a leadership capacity. However, they
cannot believe, and the Court should not compel, Hastings from endorsing that belief via
a “special exception” to a universally applied policy.
The Christian Legal Society’s First Amendment rights do not guarantee them the
right to access a limited public forum when the enforcement of its beliefs violate a
viewpoint-neutral prerequisite for access to the forum.151 The Boy Scouts were initially
given no option to define their organization’s leadership. Here, the Christian Legal
Society is free to do so—and has done so since its petition was denied.
The Boy Scouts of America, in fact, filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the
Christian Legal Society because of its history with this topic.152 The Boy Scouts break
down the Dale decision and state, “[t]he membership decisions of an association are
constitutionally protected if: (1) the association is expressive, and (2) the state’s forced
inclusion of an unwanted person in the association affects in a significant way the
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association’s ability to express itself.”153 The brief continues on to qualify those elements
with an exception, but Hastings does not even need it. The state is not forcing the
Christian Legal Society to include anyone.
Further, even if the Court finds that the withholding of funds is overly coercive,
this chapter of the Christian Legal Society, much like many other chapters around the
country, cannot show that a gay or lesbian student’s full involvement in the organization
would hinder its message in a significant way. Nothing on the record indicates that that
the Christian Legal Society’s mission or activity would be hindered by abiding by
Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy. On the contrary, Hastings’ chapter of the Christian
Legal Society had an openly lesbian student member, as recently as the 2003-2004
academic school year.154 During the fact-finding portion of the trial, the attorney for the
Christian Legal Society even stated that,
the point is not that that student changed the contents of the
organization’s expression by her participation. She did not. She
simply exchanged views. They learned from each other as
students in any club should. They respect one another. But the
contents and expression of [the Christian Legal Society] at
Hastings was not changed in any way nor could it have been.155
The Christian Legal Society conceded that its ability to express itself was not and could
not have been altered by the presence of a gay or lesbian student. The standard in Dale is
simply not met in this case.
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B.

Conclusion

The First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, religion and expressive
association are two of the most fundamental rights this country holds dear. However, as
a country, we simultaneously recognize certain situations where the government has valid
concerns and interests that make these rights in absolute. A public university’s interest in
guaranteeing that all students have equal opportunities to engage in meaningful
extracurricular activities is, indeed, one of them.
Where the government limits a public speech forum, it must do so neutrally and
across-the-board.156 However, such truly viewpoint-neutral limitations on free speech are
constitutional if they further the goals of limiting the forum and are reasonably and noncoercively applied. Here, the Hastings Law School requires student organizations to
comply with a standard non-discrimination policy to gain full recognition and utilize
some specific benefits of such recognition. Because the language of the policy must
necessarily be included in the bylaws of every organization, because it reasonably
enables the school to make certain that all students have full access to organizations and
educational opportunities, and because it is the least coercive and least-limiting method
possible, the Supreme Court of the United States must affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in finding the policy constitutional.
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